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ABSTRACTS OF REC'ENT CASES.
[Selected from the current of American and English Decisions.]
BY
HORACE L. CHEYNEY, HENRY N. SMALTZ, JOHN A. MCCARTHY.
ACTIoN FOR DEATH OF HUSBAND-- EGLIGENCE-PROXIMATE
CAUsE. -A statute of Colorado giving a right of action to the husband or
wife of a decedent killed by the negligent act of another, provides also
" that if there be no husband or wife, or he or she fails to sue within one
year after such death, then (suit may be brought) by the heir or heirs of
the deceased." Within the year after the death of her husband the
plaintiff instituted proceedings against one Anderson and was nonsuited
upon the ground that Anderson was not a proper party defendant. Two
weeks after the termination of the suit, but nineteen months after her hus-
band's death, the plaintiff began the present action against the defendant.
It was held: That since the statute was remedial it was entitled to a
liberal construction, and as the wife had bona fide began an action within
the year, even though against a wrong party, that was sufficient indica-
tion of her intention to assert and maintain her statutory right: Hayes
v. Williams, Supreme Court of Colorado, June 6, 1892, HELM , J. t30
Pacific Rep., 352).-J. A. -1cC.
ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS-VALIDITY.--The in-
solvency of a banking corporation rendered immediate action necessary
in order to preserve the property from destruction and protect creditors.
Of the seven directors three were non-residents, and of the latter one
had sold his stock and had done nothing with the bank for several years,
another was travelling and his whereabouts was unknown; the third
lived in another State and was inaccessible for immediate notice. The
four remaining directors, being a quorum, called a meeting of the board
of directors authorizing the president and secretary of the bank to assign
all the property to one Shumway for the benefit of creditors; in pursu-
ance whereof a deed of assignment was executed in due form and prop-
erly filed. Subsequently two of the absent directors recognized the
validity of the assignment by attending and participating in the election
of an assignee as provided by the law. There was no objection either on
the part of the bank as a corporation or any director, to the assignment.
Held: That these circumstances were sufficient to constitute an excep-
tion to the positive rule requiring all the directors of an insolvent cor-
poration to join in and become parties to an assignment for the benefit
of creditors, and that a writ of mandamus would issue to compel Shum-way
to discharge his duties as assignee: National Bank of Commerce v.
Shumway, Supreme Court of Kansas, July 8, I892, HORTON, C. J. ,3o
Pacific Rep., 411).-J. A. .171cC.
BONDS-CHANGE IN OBLIGATION-RELEASE OF SURETY-DEATH.-
The cashier of a bank, who had given bond for the faithful performance
of his duties, undertook for an additional compensation to keep the book
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known as the "individual ledger." He embezzled the funds of the
bank, and in an action brought against the executrix of the surety on
the bond, held: That the undertaking to perform duties not belonging
to the office of cashier did not effect such a change of duties as to dis-
charge the surety from his liability. That the undertaking of the surety
"for himself, his heirs, executors and administrator" during the period
of the cashier's employment as such was not affected by the death of the
surety: Shackamaxon Bank v. Tard, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
July 13, 1892, per WILLIAMIS, J. (24 AtI. Rep., 635). - H. V. S.
CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-REASONABLE REGULATIONS-REFUS-
ING TIcKET.-Where a ticket was refused by a gateman because its date
was illegible, and the holder thereby lost the train, in an action brought
against the railroad for damages, held: That as the ticket was in the
same condition as when purchased from defendant's agent, it was unrea-
sonable that the plaintiff should be compelled to present the ticket to a
ticket receiver for endorsement, and the defendant was liable in such
damages as were the immediate consequence of its wrongful act: North-
ern Cent. Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, Court of Appeals of 'Maryland, June 8,
1892, per ROBINSON, J. (24 Atl. Rep., 449).-H. N. S.
CARRIERS-EJECTMENT OF PASSENGER.-The plaintiff was ejected
from defendant's train for refusing to pay his fare after the ticket which
he presented was refused by the conductor because it had expired.
Held: (I) That the right to eject him for non-payment of fare is in no
way affected by any belief he may have had as to his right to ride on the
ticket after its expiration; (2) In the absence of any statutory regulation
affecting the manner of ejection of a passenger refusing to pay his fare,
he may be ejected at any place along the line, provided he be not thereby
unreasonably exposed to danger: Rudy v,. Rio Grande Ry. Co., Supreme
Court of Utah, June 17, 1892, ANDERSON, J. (30 Pacific Rep., 366).-
I. A. Xi-cC
CHARTER PARTY-" RESTRAINT OF RULERS," ETC.-QUARANTINE
REGULATIONS-DUTY OF VESSEL.-A vessel, agreed by charter, party to
be at a certain port, and, in all respects, ready to load under the charter
on or before October I, "restraint of princes or rulers of people " being
excepted. By reason of quarantine regulations of the port the vessel
could not go there until November I, when the quarantine was raised.
It was held that detention, by quarantine, was included in the scope of the
clause, "restraint of rulers," etc., but that it was the duty of the vessel to
have been at the port of loading within a reasonable time after the
quarantine was raised: The Progreso, Circuit Court of Appeals of the
United States, Third Circuit, May 24, 1892, GREEN, J. (5o Fed. Rep.,
S3 ).-H. L. C.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-M11ARRIED WOMEN-CONTRACTS-PLACE OF
PERFORMANCE AND EXECUTION.-B., a married woman, signed and
sealed in Pennsylvania a bond and mortgage to secure the purchase
money of land in Delaware. This was delivered in Delaware by her hus-
.band as her agent. The land was sold subject to the mortgage, and as a
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subsequent foreclosure sale did not realize the mortgage debt, judgment
was entered on the bond in order to collect from B. in Pennsylvania the.
balance due. Her application to open judgment was granted, on the
ground that the bond was a Pennsylvania contract, and it could not be
enforced against her except as to the land. On appeal, held: That the
laws of Delaware under which a married woman is personally liable on
such a bond should be enforced, as being the law of the place where the
contract was not only to be performed, but was executed; the place
where a contract was executed being determinable from the place where
it is delivered, regardless of where it is prepared and signed: Baum v.
Birchall, et ux., Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, July 13, 1892, WILLIAMS,
J. (24 Atl. Rep., 62o).-H. N. S.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-PoLICE POWER.
-Article XXXIV of the Maryland code provides that "All persons
claiming logs cast by wind and tide upon any shore bordering upon the
Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries, are hereby prohibited from removing
the same without payment to the owner of the said shore the sum of
twenty-five cents for each log so removed." This statute is valid and con-
stitutional as an exercise of the police power of the State; although the
logs may have carried away from a point without the boundaries of the
State: Henry v. Roberts, Circuit Court of the United States, District of
Maryland, May 16, 1892, MORRIS, J. (50 Fed. Rep., 9o3).-H. L. C.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-INSPECTION OF PRIVATE PAPERS.-The
president of an insolvent national bank, who was charged with a viola-
tion of the national banking laws, filed a bill in equity against the
receiver of the bank, praying that the latter be compelled to deliver to
the complainant a certain trunk which was deposited in the vaults of the
bank at the time of the appointment of the receiver, and which the bill
alleged contained certain private papers of the complainant. Upon hear-
ing the Court appointed a master to privately examine the contents of
said trunk, with directions to deliver to the complainant such papers as
belonged to him, to deliver to the receiver any papers belonging to the
bank which did not concern the prosecution of the president, and to hold
until further orders such papers as related to the business of the bank,
and which were material in the prosecution of the president of the bank.
It was held that this order was a violation of the constitutional and
fundamental right of the litigant as to the method of trial : Potter v_
Beal, Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States, First Circuit, June II,
1892, PUTNAM, J. (So Fed. Rep., 86o).-H. L. C
CONTRACTS-IILLEGAL AGREE-MENT.-Where the plaintiff leased
premises for the keeping of liquor for sale, the landlord agreeing to
supply ice to keep the premises cool, if the sale of such liquor is in
violation of a State statute and illegal, the tenant cannot recover for
damage to the liquor caused by failure of the landlord to supply ice as
agreed: Kelly v. Courter, Supreme Court of Oklahoma, July 1, 1892,
CLARK, 3. (30 Pacific Rep., 372).-,. A. MfcC.
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CRIA NNAIL LAW-EVIDENCE-VOLUNTARY CoNF.EssIoN.-The ac-
cused in an indictm!nt for murder said to the sheriff, "I have sent for
you to tell you about my case," to which the sheriff replied, "If you are
going to tell the truth I will listen to it and want to hear it; if you are
not going to tell the truth I don't want to hear it." The declarations of
the accused testified to by the sheriff being admitted in evidence, and
excepted to, on appeal held: That the confession made to the sheriff was
voluntary and admissible: Haul v. State, Supreme Court of Alabama,
May 26, 1892, per COLEmAN, J. (ii So. Rep., 218).-H. N. S.
EXPERT EVIDENC.-In an action against a railroad company for
an injury to the plaintiff sustained by a train running into a snowbank,
the question at issue was whether the train was running at a dangeous
rate of speed at the time. Held: That neither the engineer nor con-
ductor could be called as experts to testify as to that fact: Fisher v.
Oregon S. L. and U. N. Ry. Co., Supreme Court of Oregon, June 21, 1892,
FORD, J. (30 Pacific Rep., 425).-J. A M.CC.
FELLOW SERVANTS-INJURY TO SERVANT.-The plaintiff, a brake-
man in defendant company's employ, was injured while coupling flat
cars, because of insufficient room between one of the cars and the lumber
on the other, which was so loaded as to project beyond the end of the
car. Held: That inasmuch as it was the duty of the company to furnish
a safe place for coupling, it was not excused by having furnished an
inspector to whose omission the accident was due; his negligence not
being that of a fellow servant: Dewey v. Detroit G. H. & M. Ry. Co.,
Supreme Court of Michigan, July 28, 1892, MCGRATH, J., MONTGOBERY
and GRANT, J.J., dissent (52 Northwestern Rep., 942).-J. A. MfcC.
FIRE INSURANC-CONSTRUCTION OF POLICY-HAZARDOUS USE OF
PREiISES.-The printed part of a policy of insurance, issued at a time
when the insured premises were unoccupied, provided that it should.
become void if benzine, gasoline, etc., or other explosives should be kept
or used on the premises. These were the only uses prohibited by the
policy as hazardous. A written slip attached to and made part of the
policy, provided that the premises were "privileged to be occupied for
hazardous or extrahazardous purposes." Held: That inasmuch as there
was a glaring inconsistency between the printed and written part of the
policy, that which is written must prevail; also that the use of the
premises as a paint factory in which benzine and gasoline were kept and
used in the manufacture of paints, was permissible by the written part of'
the policy: Russell v. Ianufacturers and Builders' Fire Insurance Co.
of New York, Supreme Court of Minnesota, July 7, 1892, MITCHELL, J.
(52 Northwestern Rep., 9o6).--. ATC.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS ACTING WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF STATE
-QUO WARRANTo-Although the courts of a State other than that in
which a corporation is created, have no power to oust such corporation
of its right to be a corporation, or to interfere in any manner with the
exercise of the rights and franchises conferred upon it by the State where
incorporated, yet where such corporation is found transacting business in
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another State and exercising the franchises conferred upon its corpora-
tions, without any authority, the courts of the latter State may by a pro-
ceeding in quo warranto oust the corporation from the exercise of such
franchises: State v. The Fidelity and Casualty Company, Supreme
Court of Ohio, June 24, 1892, MARSHALL, J. (3I N. E. Rep., 65 8). - H. L. C.
FOURTEENTH AmENDMENT-CIVIL RIGHTS-THEATRES-COLORLD
PERSoNS.-In the absence of a State "civil rights statute," a rule of a
theatre prohibiting colored persons from occupying seats in certain por-
tions of it, may be enforced, as such rule is not a violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, declarig
that no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States . nor
deny to any person the equal protection of the laws: Younger v. Judab,
Supreme Court of Missouri, July 2, I892, BLACK, J. (i 9 S. W. Rep., io9).
-H. L. C.
JUDICIAL SALE--TITLE OF PURCHASER.-The reversal for errors or
irregularities of a decree ordering a sale of land will not affect a pur-
chaser in good faith, providing the Court had jurisdiction to pass the
decree, and all necessary parties were before the court: Benson, at. aL, v.
Yellott, el. al., Court of Appeals of Maryland, June 7, 1892, per FOWLER,
J. (24 Atl. Rep., 45i).--H. AV S.
JUROR-COMPETENcY-OPINION AS TO GUILT OR INNOCENCE.-
A juror who states upon his voir dire that he has formed an opinion as
to the guilt or innocence of the accused, which will require evidence to
remove, is incompetent, although he may state that he can discard the
opinion that he has forned, and give the defendant as fair and impartial
a trial as though he had never heard of the case: Vance v. State, Supreme
Court of Arkansas, June 25, 1892, HUGHES, J. (i9 S. IV. Rep., Io-6).-
H. L. C.
MkARRIAGE-MN[INOR-RIGHT TO EARN-INGS.-The marriage of a
minor son, even without the consent of his father, effects an emancipa-
tion, and the son is entitled to his wages, in so far as they are necessary
for thz support of himsalf and family, in preference to his father: Com-
monwealth v. Graham, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Jun:e
24, 1892, FIELD, C. J. (31 N\. E. Rep., 766).-H. L. C
NEGLIGENcE-TENE-MENT HOUSES-LIABILITY OF LANDLORD TO
THIRD PERsONS.-The owner of a tenement house is not liable for in-
juries sustiined by a person caused by the defective condition of the
steps leading to the different parts thereof, where the injuries were re-
ceived while the plaintiff was coming from a wake held in the house, to
which she had neither an express invitation nor one by implication as
being a relative or friend of the deceased : Hart a, Cole, Supreme Judicial
Court of MIassachusetts, June 22, 1892, KNOWLTON,J. k3l N. E. Rep., 644).
-H.L. C
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PERSOINAL INJURY-UNAUTHORIZED DISPLAY OF FIRE WORKS.-A
person who is a voluntary spectator of a display of fire works in a public
highway, cannot recover damages for injuries sustained by an explosion
of the fire works, if such explosion occurred without negligence, even if
the display is without legal authority: Scanlon v. Wedger, Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, June 21, 1892, ALLEN, J. (31 N. E.Rep.,
642).-H. L. C.
PLEADING-INSURANCE-CO-NDITIO.NS OF POLIcY-D.PARTURE.-
A clause of the policy of fire insurance upon which suit was brought,
provided for the selection of appraisers and an award in case the parties
differed as to the amount of the loss. Held (I) that compliance with the
provision was a condition precedent to the maintenance of an action by
the assured and a failure to allege in the complaint the appointment of
appraisers, and an award was fatal to the plaintiff's case; (2) that plaintiff
could not cure the defect in his complaint by relying upon the answer of
the defendant which did allege the appointment and award, especially
when by certain averments in his replication he put in issue the very
allegations in the answer upon which he relied to cure the defect; (3)
that it could not be contended that there was a departure because the
replication admitted the award, but alleged fraud in the procurement of
it, since the plaintiff could not quit or depart from a case made in the
complaint, when none had been made: Monsess v. German-American In-
surance Co., Supreme Court of Minnesota, July -I, 1892, COLLINS, J. (52
Northwestern Rep., 932).-J. A. hrcc.
POWERS-]XECUTION-CONFLICT OF LAws.-Testatrix, domiciled
in R. I., bequeathed one-sixth of her residuary estate in trust for the
benefit of her grandson during his life, and at his death to those whom
he should appoint by will, and in default of such appointment, then to
her heirs-at-law. The grandson died in New York without issue, leaving
a will in which he did not mention the fund in question nor execute the
power given him. By New York law a general bequest passes property
over which the testator has a power of appointment, unless a contrary
intention appears. In R. I., an intent to execute a power must appear
affirmatively. Upon issue, raised by a bill in equity, whether there had
been an execution of the power by the residuary clause of the will.
Held: That where the execution of a power is in question, the law of the
domicile of the donor governs, and not that of the domicile of the donce.
That an intent to execute the power could not be inferred where the will
contained no reference thereto; though the relations of the donce to the
donor were so intimate as to raise a presumption that he knew of the
contents of the donor's will, and, though the donce in his will, made
bequests exceeding the amount of his estate: Cotting v. De Sartiges,
el. al., Supreme Court of Rhode Island, March 28, 1S92, per STiNESs, J.
(24 Atl. Rep., 53 o).-H. N. S.
RESCISSION OF SALE-EFFECT OF A FAILURE TO CALL A MATERIAL
WITNESS.-Where a defendant resists the foreclosure of a purchase
money mortgage of a mine upon the ground that the purchase was in-
duced by the fraudulent misrepresentations of the plaintiffs, it is abso-
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lutely essential to his success that such misrepresentations were the
proximate inducement to the purchase. But where the evidence dis-
closed that before the purchase defendant in company with an ex-
perienced miner examined the mine tor several days; that afterward
defendant was enthusiastic about the purchase and told several witnesses
that he bought the property on his own judgment and the judgment
of the expert; that after the purchase he surveyed and worked the mine
for nearly two years before executing the notes and mortgage in suit, and
made no complaint of the mine until plaintiffs threatened to bring the
action. Held (i) that the evidence justified the finding that defendant
did not make the purchase, relying on plaintiffs representations; (2)
that, the failure of the defendant to secure the testimony of a person
present when the alleged misrepresentations were made without ex-
plaining why such person was not called, authorized the inference that
the testimony if produced would be averse to the defendant: Wimer v.
Smith, Supreme Court of Oregon, July 2, 1892, LORD, J. (30 Pacific Rep.,
416).-J. A. fcC.
SATISFACTION OF JUDG.%iEN T-AUTHORITY OF ATTORNE.-A re-
covered a judgment of $i,ooo against B in an action of slander. There
was some doubt as to the correctness of the judgment, and before an
appeal was taken the attorneys of both parties agreed upon a compromise
that B should pay A $600 in full satisfaction, which sum was paid and the
judgment satisfied of record. Two years later a motion on the part of A
to strike off the satisfaction, upon the ground that his attorney had no
authority to effect the same, was sustained. B then filed a petition
praying the Court to enjoin the collection of the excess of $6oo, alleging
that A owned but one-half of the judgment, and that his attorney who
effected the compromise owned the other half. Held: that B was en-
titled to equitable relief. NOWAL, J., dissented upon the ground that
the order vacating the entry of satisfaction was res adjudicata as to all
matters which could have been litigated at the hearing, among which
were the facts contended for in the plaintiffs petition : Phillips v. Kuhn,
Supreme Court of Nebraska, July 2, 1892, MAXWELL, C. J. (52 North-
western Rep., 8Si).-J. 4. cC.
SERIVICE OF \,VRITS-AMENfDME.T or RETURN-POWERS OF Ex-
SHERIFF.-After a sheriff or deputy sheriff has gone out of office, he can-
not, without some order of the Court giving direction in the matter,
amend an incomplete or defective return of service made by him while
in office: Beutell v. Oliver, el al., Supreme Court of Georgia, April 28,
1892 (I 5 S. R. Rep., 307).-R. D. S.
SLANDER-EXEMPLARY DAMGES-IVIALIc.-Exemplary damages
can only be awarded in an action of slander where the defendant was
actuated by malice toward the plaintiff. The law implies malice where
the words spoken impute a crime to the plaintiff, and the defendant
asserts their truth in his answer and reiterates the same upon the witness
stand at the trial, it having been shown they were false: Walker v'.
Wickens, Supreme Court of Kansas, June I1, 1892, per. ciur. (30 Pacific
Reporter, I8i).-J. A. JlfcC.
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STOR9KEEPERS-CAR- OF CUSTOMERS' PROPERTY-BAILMENT.-
Where one entered a store for the purchase of clothing, and deposited
his watch for safe-keeping in a drawer, designated by the salesman, and
after his purchase the watch could not be found, in an action brought to
recover the value of the watch. Held. That as such deposit was a neces-
sary incident of defendant's business, he was a bailee for hire, and as such
bound to exercise ordinary diligence, and only in the absence of such
diligence would he be liable if the watch was stolen: Woodruff v. Painter,
el. at., Supreme Court of Penna., July 13, 1892, per HE-DRICK, J. (24
AtI. Rep., 62o).-H. X. S.
TENANT Ix COM.31ON-PAROL PARTITION-EJEcTmENT.-Where a
parol partition of lands is made by tenants in common, and the premises
are occupied according to the partition by the respective parties, the
partition will be valid, and such partition may be set up as a defence
should an action be brought to recover the possession, in violation of the
parol partition, and a bill in equity may be maintained to compel the
delivery of a deed. But ejectment will not lie to recover possession of a
part allotted by such parol partition, as in ejectment the plaintiff must
recover upon a legal title and not upon an equity, and the parol partition
may not be treated as a deed: Sontag v. Bigelow, Supreme Court of
Illinois, June IS, 1892, CRAIG, J. (31 N. E. Rep., 674).-H. L. C
TRADEMARKs-LABELS COUNTERFEITING.-The law protects labels
for the same reasons that it protects trademarks, and where labels are so
successfully counterfeited that ordinary purchasers, buying with the
degree of care usual in purchases of the article, are deceived, the com-
plaining party is entitled to protection: Wirtz v. Eagle Bottling Co.,
Court of Chancery of New Jersey, July IS, 1892, per VAN FrEET, V.C.
(24 Atl. Rep., 65S).-H. N. S.
"THE ADOPTION OF A UNIFORM BILL OF LAD-
ING IN INTERNATIONAL COMMIERCE."
The October Number of the AMfERICAN LAW REGIS-
TER AND REVIEW will contain an article on the Adoption
of a Standard Bill of Lading in International Commerce, by
the distinguished admiralty lawyer MORTON P. HENRY,
Esq. In view of the fact that legislation on this subject
will occupy the attention of Congress at the coming session,
the topic is a peculiarly timely one; and those of our readers
who agree with 'Mr. HENRY'S views should not fail to put
a copy of the October number into the hands of their repre-
sentatives at Washington.
